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I. Introduction
The focus of this Article requires some explanation.

It is not a

recapitulation of the patterns of Medicare's politics from enactment in 1965 to
the present (2003). That is the subject of Jonathan Oberlander's other article in
* Professor of Public Policy and Management at the Yale School of Management, Professor of
Political Science, and former Director of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundations' post-doctoral program in
Health Policy from 1993-2003. Graduate of Harvard University and Wadham College, Oxford. This
work was supported in part by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The views expressed are those of
the authors and do not imply endorsement by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
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M.D., M.S., post-doctoral fellow in health policyand politicsat Yale's School ofManagement.
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Associate Professor of Social Medicine, University of North Carolina--Chapel Hill. The
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this issue. Nor is the main focus on projections of Medicare's future politics, a
daunting topic addressed only briefly here. Instead, the Article aims to make
sense of the scholarly literature on the Medicare program and its politics by
distinguishing among (and discussing) three categories of commentary:
(1) Program and policy discussion without political analysis:
literature of straightforward omission.

the

(2) Program and policy discussion with serious political analysis: the
literature of commendable commission.
(3) Program and policy evaluation that purports to incorporate political
analysis, but fails to do so credibly: the literature of regrettable
misunderstanding.
Why focus on the existing Medicare scholarship and, in particular, the
quality of political analysis in that literature? Our fundamental premise is that
the Medicare program is regularly misunderstood through ignorance of its
political history, confusion about its fundamental values, and distortion of the
program's choices by unsubstantiated presumptions about what Medicare's
purposes were supposed to be. The future of Medicare is certain to be a matter
of political concern in the decade ahead. Prudent reform depends crucially on
clarifying what the program does and does not do. That, in turn, requires
attention to Medicare's central social aims, actual historical experience, and
recognizable political identity. Our literature search revealed serious
difficulties on all three counts.
Our survey of the Medicare literature illustrates just how often Medicare is
misunderstood and how rare cogent analysis of its politics is. If the public
debate on Medicare is to be improved in these respects, we need to identify and
understand common misconceptions about the program and explain their
apparent staying power. That is the aim of this Article.
II The Literatureof StraightforwardOmission: Program andPolicy
Discussion Without PoliticalAnalysis
The dominant literature on Medicare is what many call health services
research.' The great majority of researchers working on Medicare understand
the program predominantly from the perspective of systematic policy analysis
1. This section on health services research draws on Jonathan Oberlander, Medicare and
the American State: The Politics of Federal Health Insurance, 1965-1995, at 14-20 (1995)
(Dissertation, Yale University) (on file with the author).
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and consequently view public policy largely as collective problem solving.
Often trained in economics, they have produced a vast literature on the impact
of Medicare payment policies, the structure of its benefit package, and the
economic behavior, demographic characteristics, and financial state of
Medicare beneficiaries.2 This line of scholarship suggests that if there were
more factual understanding of Medicare's circumstances, the quality of
problem solving would improve. And this work presumes that public policy
can and should be studied as a matter of objective, technical inquiry.
Health services research rests on the assumption that policy is separable
from politics. This is, as we will argue, in most respects an unsustainable
division. The technocratic perspective has at least three consequences for
understanding Medicare politics that we want to highlight. The first is that the
politics of Medicare is willfully ignored. Since the two phenomena of policy
and politics are presumed to be distinct, the analysis of policy, as a matter of
division of labor, need not explicitly attend to political analysis. Medicare
policy in this tradition is discussed independently of American political
institutions, interests, and ideologies.
The literature on Medicare's reform of its system for paying physicians is
an illuminating case in point. In 1989, the federal government replaced the
existing method of paying physicians retrospectively for their costs with a
prospectively determined fee schedule. The fee schedule-officially the
Resource Based Relative Value Scale or RBRVS-was organized around the
relative values assigned to all services that physicians provided. These
valuations in turn were based on estimates of the resources (e.g., time, training,
complexity) required by each service.
Health services researchers seriously debated whether the new payment
scale accurately reflected differences in physician effort and if it represented an
efficient means of reimbursement.3 They never, however, raised obvious
questions about the politics of the payment scheme: how did it change the
balance of power in Medicare policymaking?; which interests and institutions
did it advantage?; what were the implications for democratic accountability of
adopting a highly complex payment system dependent on bureaucratic
2. Major works on Medicare policy include DAVID BLUMENTHAL ET AL., RENEWING THE
MEDICARE & ITS REFORM (1988); KAREN DAVIS & DIANE ROWLAND, MEDICARE

PROMISE:

POLICY:

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE (1986); MARILYN MOON,
MEDICARE: Now AND IN THE FUTURE (1993); LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF
MEDICARE (Mark V. Pauly & William L. Kissick, eds., 1988); and MEDICARE REFORM: ISSUES

AND ANSWERS (Andrew J. Rettenmaier & Thomas R. Saving eds., 1999).
3.
WILLIAM C. HSIAO ET AL., FINAL REPORT: RESOURCE BASED RELATIVE VALUE SCALES
OF SELECTED MEDICAL AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES IN MASSACHUSETTS (1985).
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expertise?; why had the U.S. cloaked a fee schedule for Medicare in such
highly technical terminology when other nations such as Canada and Germany
did so via straightforward political bargaining and negotiation between
providers and payors? 4 In short, the evaluative literature largely ignored the
political implications of payment reform.
Marilyn Moon's Medicare: Now and In the Futureprovides another clear
illustration of the literature of omission. Moon's intent is to provide an
overview of the program since its enactment in 1965. She aims to explain this
"fascinating and complex healthcare program" on the presumption that it is
"often not well understood. '6 In this task, Moon succeeds brilliantly, providing
a lucid account of the policy challenges confronting Medicare.
A striking feature of this volume is its mix of clear description and
political inattention. So, for example, Moon deftly describes the program's
expansion of beneficiaries in the 1970s from an elderly constituency to both the
disabled and those suffering from renal failure. Her book uses Medicare's
fiscal realities to criticize two myths that appear regularly in Medicare debates.
She notes correctly that after 1985, Medicare's annual rate of increase in per
capita expenditures fell below that of private health insurance outlays for
comparable coverage. Secondly, she debunks the claim that increasing
numbers of Americans over sixty-five "must be a major factor in Medicare's
growth." 7 With the number of beneficiaries at that time increasing by 1.1
percent per year, aging could not possibly account for the much larger annual
growth in Medicare's expenditures. Moon's book is a financial and
demographic account that sets the record straight on many key topics.
What Medicare spent, to whom and for whom, is what this book
illuminates best. Moon's analysis is a comprehensive and compelling account
of policy issues in Medicare reform, past and present. Yet, when discussing
Medicare's possible future, Moon's analysis proceeds as if one were discussing
the United States as a person, someone facing a set of future developments and
wondering what would be best to do. Indeed, this mode is hardly restricted to
Moon's volume, but rather is characteristic of the great bulk of contemporary
4. See William A. Glaser, Designing Fee Schedules by Formulae, Politics, and
Negotiations,80 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 804, 806-08 (1990) (pointing out the inherent limitations
of the Harvard RBRVS).
5. See generallyMOON, supra note 2 (providing an overview of Medicare's finances and
programmatic development since 1967).
6. Id. at xv.
7. Id. at 23. See also MARILYN MOON, MEDICARE Now AND IN THE FUTURE 25 (2d ed.
1996) (updating the data on aging). Between 1982 and 1996, the number of Medicare
beneficiaries rose at a rate of 1.9%, suggesting that the aging of the population is not a major
contributor to Medicare's growth. Id.
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policy analysts.
The political world in which programs operate is
acknowledged, but not analyzed, and sophisticated policy analysis is not
matched by the same commitment to political analysis. Instead, the approach is
to start with the nation as a person, ask what are the problems at present, and
assume that rational agents will review options and choose sensible means to
agreed-upon ends. Moon, like others in this craft tradition, knows this is
unrealistic. (In fact, she uses the term "messy" to describe the fight over
catastrophic coverage in 1988-1989).8 But, that does not carry over into
explicitly taking the political advantages and disadvantages of options-past,
present, or in the future-into account.
Not surprisingly, the citations of work in this policy analysis tradition
overlook most of the political analysis of Medicare that has been published. As
justification, analysts like Moon might well contend that disciplinary
specialization has important benefits and that economists like her should write
about what they know best. After all, it is better to leave out misunderstandings
than, as we shall see in the discussion later, to generate political myths. As
noted, Moon is not at all atypical in her inattention to political analysis. Indeed,
it is possible to pick almost any health services research journal and find
articles on the past, present, or future of Medicare that exhibit the same pattern.
Consider, for example, the 1999 article, RestructuringMedicarefor the Next
Century: What Will Beneficiaries Really Need?, by Christine Cassel et al. 9
This exercise in futurology notes the "tight political and fiscal constraints
surrounding Medicare reform," but leaves the matter there.' ° It describes
unrealistically only two choices (for the nation?):
One option would allow current and future generations to enter the existing
system of fragmented and poorly prioritized care, which has proved to
impose heavy cost burdens on families and society. The other would
structure health care policy in a way that promotes healthy and successful
I
aging, enabling older adults to remain productive and independent.
This dichotomy is a rhetorical device. It is neither a realistic choice nor a
forecast of the political and economic circumstances in which the favored
direction might be actually chosen. The aim is to defend one particular policy
option, not to estimate what it might take to have that option adopted or
implemented. As a vision of what Medicare might be, this normative stance is
8. MOON, supra note 2, at xvi.
9. Christine K. Cassel et al.,
RestructuringMedicare For the Next Century: What Will
BeneficiariesReally Need?, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 118, 118-31.
10. Id.at 119.
11. Id.
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perfectly understandable. As a policy option whose prospects are understood, it
lacks the understanding of what political context might favor the proposed
change in Medicare's operations.
A second consequence of the technocratic perspective embodied by health
services research is that the assumption that policy analysis should be
undertaken separately from political analysis occasionally slips into the analytic
assumption that policy is made-and therefore can be explained-without
politics. Medicare policy is interpreted as technical responses to technical
problems; efficiency substitutes for politics as explanation of how policy
change occurs. To wit, in Arnold Epstein and David Blumenthal's account of
physician payment reform, the "[r]ecognition of deficits in the CPR
methodology" motivates policymakers to reform Medicare. 2 The authors
dubiously cite methodological deficiencies as more important to the adoption of
payment reform than the federal budgetary deficits that propelled policymakers'
interests in Medicare during the 1980s.
If analysts explain Medicare primarily as a rational process of responding
to the imperatives of efficiency, they overlook critical questions: how do issues
come to be considered policy problems?; how do we account for the timing and
form of policy proposals?; and what explains the relative political attractiveness
of policy solutions? These are questions about the politics of ideas and the
construction of policy issues and alternatives that a rationalist perspective on
Medicare cannot answer, and usually does not ask.
A final consequence of the separation of policy from politics is the
normative conclusion that policy should be separated from politics. Policy
analysts often deplore the distorting impact of politics on their carefully
designed policy solutions. There is palpable frustration that the political world
will not accept the expert advice that the policy world offers. Policies are
interpreted as failing to achieve their goals because politics prevents their
adoption in the required form or ruins its implementation.
As a result, the policy prescriptions of health services researchers
sometimes seek to quarantine policy from politics. Thomas Rice and Jill
Bernstein exemplify this tendency in their 1990 discussion of an ideal
reimbursement system for Medicare. They explain that "creation of an
objective, fair way to establish performance standards [for setting limits on
Medicare payments to hospitals and physicians] would minimize political
influence," while the task remains of "ensuring that this formula rather than
12.

Arnold Epztein & David Blumenthal, Physician Payment Reform. PastandFuture,

71 MILBANK Q. 193, 196 (1993). "CPR" refers to Medicare's original system of paying
physicians on the basis of their customary, reasonable, and prevailing charges. Id. at 194.
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3
political influence is the driving force behind the standards and fee updates."
Medicare, in other words, must be isolated from politics if it is to operate
efficiently. This conclusion leads the authors to favor a payment policy
controlled by formula rather than by politics.
The attraction of policy analysts to politically-immune policies is grounded
in economic understandings of politics. Economists tend to see public policies
as the product of the preferences of social interests whose political power is in
turn a function of their economic power.14 Political institutions do not occupy a
prominent place in these scholars' analyses and there is little consideration
given to the independent potential of government actors to act apart from and
even against the agenda of social interests. Nor is there attention to the role of
ideas in the policy process. Policymaking is instead understood as driven by
the pathologies of interest group politics. In the language of political economy,
rent seeking economic interests influence governmental policy in order to
maximize their financial welfare. The result is widespread skepticism about
government regulation, preference for market solutions, and, where policies do
reside within the government's sphere, preference for policies and institutions
that are shielded from political influence.'"
The failure, then, of much of the Medicare literature to attend to politics is
not simply a failure of explanation. If prescription is the aim of policy
commentary on Medicare, it is difficult to justify ignorance of the political
institutions and circumstances through which policies are chosen and
implemented. Useful policy analysis ultimately depends on political analysis,
just as good political analysis must be informed by policy analysis. The
disjunction between Medicare policy and politics is intellectually unsustainable.
An understanding of Medicare requires knowledge of its politics because what
has taken place and will take place emerges from the central political
institutions of American government.

13. Thomas Rice & Jill Bernstein, Volume Performance Standards: Can They Control
Growth in Medicare Services?, 68 MILBANK Q. 295, 310 (1990).
14. See Mark V. Pauly, Positive Political Economy of Medicare, Past and Future, in
LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS OF MEDICARE 49,49-71 (Mark. V. Pauly & William

L. Kissick eds., 1988) (developing an economic perspective on Medicare politics).
15. But see THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED 3 (1988) (arguing
against the majority of American health economists who privilege market based health policies
and contending that "one of the main reasons for the belief that market-based systems are
superior stems from a misunderstanding of economic theory as it applies to health"); ROBERT
EVANS, STRAINED MERCY: THE ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN HEALTH CARE 5 (1984) (providing an
example of how, outside the U.S., faith in market-based systems of health care is less
homogeneous).
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Indeed, there is an argument that policy studies should take as their aim
the narrowing of disagreement about what are the actual states of affairs, the
elucidation of competing values represented in alternate courses of action, and
the sensitizing of policymakers and other audiences to complex considerations
that lie below the noise of policy warfare. "The contribution [to shaping public
policy] is likely to come through more informed debate, more substantial
argument, and more reasoned limits on unrealistic alternatives, not wholesale
6
transformation of the processes of policy-making."
III. The Literatureof Commendable Commission: The PoliticalAnalysis of
Medicare
This category of commentary is much less extensive than the apolitical
approaches just discussed. One striking feature of the scholarship on
Medicare's politics is the sharp disjunction between the substantial attention
paid to the program's origins and the relative inattention to the politics of
Medicare in operation. In the decade of the 1960s, a number of books
discussed the legislative battle over what came to be known as Medicare. 7 In
the three decades and more since, few books have sought to reinterpret the story
of how Medicare came to legislative enactment. Sheri David's 1985 account is
one, and Lawrence Jacobs's 1993 comparative study of the role of public
opinion in the birth of Medicare and the British National Health Service is the
other.' Both raise issues worth attending to in contemporary discussions of
Medicare reform.
David contends that "[b]efore [the United States] can sensibly proceed to
solve present and future health care problems," there must be an examination of
16. See Theodore Marmor, Policy Analysis, 6 J. OF POL'Y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 112,114
(1986) (reviewing three books on policy analysis); see generally DUNCAN MACRAE, JR. & JAMES
A. WILDE, POLICY ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DECISIONS (Ch. 6) (1979) (discussing the conditions
under which a policy alternative is likely to be enacted and implemented).
17. See generally, e.g., THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (2nd ed.,
2000) (discussing the debate over Medicare); M.J. SKIDMORE, MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN
RHETORIC OF RECONCILIATION (1970) (same); P.A. CORNING, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICARE...
FROM IDEA TO LAW (1969) (same); HERMAN SOMERS & ANNE SOMERS, MEDICARE AND THE
HOSPITALS: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS (1967) (same); EUGENE FEINGOLD, MEDICARE: POLICY AND
POLITICS (1966) (same); MARGARET GREENFIELD, HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED: THE 1965
PROGRAM FOR MEDICARE (1966) (same); RICHARD HARRIS, A SACRED TRUST (1966) (same);
HERMAN SOMERS & ANNE SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND HEALTH INSURANCE:

ORGANIZING AND FINANCING OF MEDICAL CARE (1961)

THE

(same).

18. See generally SHERI 1.DAVID, WITH DIGNITY: THE SEARCH FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID (1985) (interpreting Medicare's history); LAWRENCE R. JACOBS, HEALTH OF NATIONS:
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH HEALTH POLICY (1993) (same).
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the "choices, options and compromises made during the entire Medicare
debate.""9 An ample documentary account of those debates, David's book does
not, however, make a persuasive case that understanding Medicare's origins is
the necessary precondition for righting the wrongs of contemporary American
medical care.
Jacobs's book is directly relevant to the politics of contemporary
Medicare. His is a case study of the important role that public preferences and
understandings play in creating health policy.20 Jacobs relies on primary
research to substantiate claims that the central political figures in the Medicare
legislative struggle took (what they regarded as) public opinion into account. 2'
Jacobs thus challenges the argument in the work of both Oberlander and
Marmor that the mass public plays a minor (and largely restraining) role in the
details of Medicare policy making.
Jacobs's findings, which were based on archival and interview sources,
improve the understanding of developments that other commentaries ignore.
He found, for example, important splits between the architects of Medicare in
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and fiscally cautious
leaders in the Bureau of the Budget. The former favored conciliation and
accommodation with American medical care providers-especially using
private insurance companies as fiscal intermediaries-so as to make the road to
their national health insurance dreams more likely. The latter-the federal
budget officials-regarded the control of expected inflation as primary and
thought the direct federal administration of Medicare would control costs more
reliably. That was a fateful policy choice-a victory for HEW's
accommodation policy. And, Jacobs's book reveals a hidden part of
Medicare's administrative birth that remains an important issue today.
The political analysis of Medicare in operation has been modest in
amount, almost all article length, and much less connected to the general
features of American politics than was the case with the fight over the
program's enactment. Jonathan Oberlander's book, published in 2003, is a
recent development and his bibliography provides the basis for my
generalization about the literature.22
19.

DAVID, supra note 18, at 156-57.

20.

JACOBS, supra note 18, at 4.

21. See id. at 32-38 (finding that papers in the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson
Presidential library files document the institutionalization of a public opinion apparatus in
presidential decision making).
22. See generally JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE (2003)
(providing comprehensive political analysis of the development of Medicare since its enactment
in 1965).
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There are nonetheless a number of illuminating accounts of why the
Medicare program has developed as it has. Timothy Jost's account of the
administrative politics of Medicare-while concentrating on the role of
courts-parallels the understandings of both the Marmor and Oberlander
volumes about the patterns of policymaking. These include congressional
domination of much of Medicare's policymaking, the prominence of fiscal
politics in the period since 1983, and the relative weakness of public opinion in
expanding Medicare's benefits and its relative strength in constraining largescale reductions of benefits. 23 The importance of all three considerations in
what Medicare's fate will be in the future makes this kind of work especially
relevant to contemporary policy analysis.
Broader accounts of American politics in the 1990s provide additional
understanding of the forces that shape Medicare's fate now and in the future.
The work of Mark Peterson on changing patterns of congressional decisionmaking is one example.24 Equally relevant is Lawrence Jacobs's and Robert
Shapiro's recent scholarship on public opinion, which confirms the important
role of the views of the mass public in constraining efforts to restrict
Medicare's benefits and its lesser impact on other features of Medicare
policymaking in the decade. 2' Also important is an article by Lawrence Brown
in the Health Care Financing Review that explicitly addresses the theme of this
essay: namely, the relative ease with which policy analysts describe the
"problems" that "need" fixing and the truly complicated politics of Medicare
26
reform in the first half of the 1990s.
The purpose of this section is not to review the entire field of useful
analysis of Medicare's politics. Rather, it is to sharply distinguish efforts that
take politics into account and those that do not. David Smith's new book,
Entitlement Politics, illustrates well the former category.27 In dealing, for
example, with how to explain the character of the Breaux-Thomas Bipartisan
23.

Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Governing Medicare, 51

24.

Mark A. Peterson, The Politics of Health Care Policy; Overreaching in an Age of

ADMIN.

L. REV. 39,40 (1999).

Polarization, in THE SOCIAL DIVIDE: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FUTURE OF ACTIVIST
GOVERNMENT 181-229 (Margaret Weir ed., 1998).

25. See generally LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON'T
PANDER: POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE LOSS OF DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS (2000)
(discussing the "partisan duel" over social policy in the 1990s).
26.

See Lawrence D. Brown, The Politics of Medicare and Health Reform, Then and

Now, 18 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 163, 164-68 (1996) (analyzing the political struggles that have
shaped the debate over Medicare, past and present).
27. See generally DAVID G. SMITH, ENTITLEMENT POLITICS: MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
1995-2001 (2002) (examining partisan approaches to the future of federal health care
entitlements).
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Commission on The Future.of Medicare in the late 1990s, Smith relies on the
roles, personnel, and prior commitments of the actors.28 He concentrates on
explaining the commission, though he addresses the evaluation of policy
options as well. The commission "as an exercise in bipartisan collaboration...2 9
was a dismal failure that, at best, provides cautionary lessons for the future.
Never "a serious effort to come together in a genuine bipartisan way," the
commission, Smith rightly argues, was an "episode in the continuing struggle
over the future of Medicare."3 "[M]ost of the [commission's] appointees"
were, in fact, "major players 3in that conflict, with strong political and program
commitments of their own.", 1
Any appeal to bipartisan commissions in the future should attend to such a
cautionary analysis. The same applies to interpreting the persistent appeal in
contemporary Medicare debates to the advantages of "competition" in
reforming the program. Smith's summary is contestable, but calls for serious
analysis. "Despite the lack of systematic evidence or even persuasive
argument," he contends, "confidence in the efficacy of market competition to
constrain the costs of managed care plans seems to be an unexamined belief
32
based upon occasional behavior, a few regional examples, or faith.
Jonathan Oberlander has written the most comprehensive and extended
account of what Medicare's politics have been like.33 He divides the policies
and politics into three categories: (1) disputes about benefit policies, with a
pattern of what might be termed nondistributive politics; 34 (2) financing policy
issues, where the pattern has been one of recurrent crisis politics; 35 and
(3) federal payment policies, where the politics have centered on Medicare's
impact on the federal budget.36 Again, the point is not to explore the content of
the patterns; Oberlander's article does that. Rather, it is to highlight the
absence of such portraits in the conventional treatment of Medicare policy
making.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 350-51.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 354.

33. See generally OBERLANDER, supra note 22 (providing a comprehensive study of
Medicare politics).
34. See id. at 36 (noting the lack of expansion in Medicare benefits).
35. See id. at 74 (discussing the various financing crises faced by Medicare).
36. See id. at 107 (discussing Medicare's payment practices and budget issues).

1148

60 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1137 (2003)

IV. The LiteratureofRegrettableMisunderstanding: Program and Policy
Evaluation with Misleading PoliticalAnalysis
The current discussion of Medicare, like its history, includes considerable
disagreement, with frustrating gaps between claims and evidence." Here, we
emphasize an especially important source of distortion, namely policy
commentary that reflects careless and misleading political analysis. This
problem is unmistakable in the arguments voucher proponents made in the
debate over Medicare's future during the late 1990S.31 In this section, we
address four aspects of what we regard as myth-ridden debate: (1) the
unsubstantiated invocation of public opinion to justify policy judgments;
(2) misplaced confidence in long-term forecasts and inattention to the
interaction of economic and political factors in forecasting; (3) contestable
claims presented as "conventional wisdom"; and (4) explicit political analysis
without understanding. We rely on arguments for vouchers to illustrate the
problematic use of public opinion and the limits of political forecasting.
Addressing misconceptions in the conventional wisdom and limited political
analysis broadens our focus beyond vouchers. But, throughout, we aim to
clarify the Medicare debate by approaching these topics as political scientists, a
perspective too often absent from the larger national debate.
A. How Not to Use Public Opinion
Enthusiasm for converting Medicare into a system of voucher payments
culminated, as noted, in the majority-supported proposal of the Breaux-Thomas
Commission and its subsequent introduction as legislation. 39 To see how
voucher advocates have justified these plans analytically, we turn to the work of
economists Henry Aaron and Robert Reischauer, whose writings on vouchers
have been especially extensive, if in the end still disappointing. The reputation
for thoughtfulness of these scholars makes the imprecision of their Medicare
37.

This section draws extensively on Theodore R. Marmor & Gary J. McKissick,

Medicare's Future: Fact, Fiction and Folly, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 238-48 (2000).
38. See Theodore Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, Rethinking Medicare Reform, HEALTH
Arr., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 52, 53 (analyzing the proposed voucher plan). Under the Republican

proposal, Medicare beneficiaries would receive a voucher to purchase health insurance from the
private insurance market and this would replace the government-organized insurance Medicare
currently provides. Id.
39. See NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON THE FUTuRE OF MEDICARE, BUILDING A
BETTER MEDICARE FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW, at http://thomas.loc.gov/medicare/bbmtt31599.
html (Mar. 6, 1999) (recommending changing Medicare into a premium support system) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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political analysis all the more troubling. Their 1995 HealthAffairs article, The
MedicareReform Debate: What is the Next Step?,40 is a particularly revealing
illustration of misleading political analysis.
The scope of their article is quite broad: the proposal to convert Medicare
4
"from a 'service reimbursement' system into a 'premium support' system." '
They liken this proposal to "many that are now reshaping private employerbased insurance. 4 2 They purport not only to describe the technical issues that
"cannot be solved quickly" and "preclude quick budget savings," but also to
provide a brief history of Medicare and why it is unsustainable in its present
form.4 3 In short, they engage in historical characterization, political analysis,
policy evaluation, and program forecasting. They also take pains to caution
readers that "[t]he history of reforms in U.S. social policy is replete with
exaggerated claims of the benefits the reform will produce. To muster
enthusiasm, supporters of reform paint rosy pictures of the marvelous benefits
that will ensue if only their recommendations are adopted.""4 They could have
added that reform advocates regularly invent political analysis to bolster their
claims of expertise. Aaron and Reischauer have many sensible things to say
about how Medicare has operated and why cost savings are difficult under any
implementable reform. However, their characterization of Medicare's political
history and contemporary political circumstances is simply misleading.
The most striking feature of this kind of analysis is misplaced analytical
confidence. Here we will summarize and focus on a subset of factual claims
and their supposedly obvious "implications" to illustrate the weaknesses of this
sort of political analysis. 45 The claim that Medicare's "popularity" is not only
40. See generally Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, The MedicareReform Debate:
What is the Next Step?, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 8 (illustrating misleading political

analysis).
41. Id. at20.
42.

Id. at 8.

43.

See id. at 9-12 (using the history of Medicare to bolster their argument).

44.

Id. at 27-28.

45. The claims we will analyze derive from two of the opening paragraphs of Aaron and
Reischauer's examination of the Medicare reform debate in 1995. "Five central facts," the
reader is told, "will shape the debate on the future of Medicare."
First, Medicare enjoys overwhelming support among the American electorate, a
popularity that is well deserved because the program has achieved all of its
designers' major objectives. Second, the cost of providing Medicare benefits is
projected to rise very rapidly and will exceed projected revenues by ever larger
amounts. Third, legislative reform of the entire health care system is now off the
political agenda and likely will remain so for years to come. Fourth, there exists a
strong and broad consensus against raising taxes. Fifth, dramatic changes are
taking place in the way health care is financed and delivered for the non-Medicare
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"overwhelming" but "well deserved because the program has achieved all its
designers' major objectives" 46 is clearly contestable. The authors cite no
evidence to support their claims about the breadth and depth of the public's
views. While the work of Larry Jacobs and other public opinion scholars
establishes that Medicare enjoys broad approval, that same work undercuts the

easy connection between knowledge of the program (especially the extent to
which objectives are understood to have been satisfied) and support for the
program.4' To the extent Medicare is broadly popular, that support mostly
reflects a relatively superficial understanding of Medicare's role in helping
America's elderly with large medical expenses.49 Other than that, the public is

largely uninformed.50
Nor can it be the case that the public is satisfied because the major
objectives of Medicare's designers' have all been achieved. That, of course, is

one of the major conclusions of the program's history: The key objective of
population.
The implications of these facts are straightforward. First, before changes are made
in Medicare, policymakers will have to assure the general population and
beneficiaries alike that the reforms will not compromise the attributes of the
program that the public values so much. Second, Congress will have to act soon to
restore Medicare's financial viability. Third, the measures that Congress adopts
will not be part of any major legislative effort to reform the overall health care
system. Fourth, most, if not all, of the budgetary savings on Medicare will come
from reducing federal payments to providers and raising costs to beneficiaries, not
from raising Medicare payroll taxes. Fifth, congressional reforms will-and
should-bring Medicare more in line with the structure of health care financing and
delivery that is evolving to serve the non-Medicare population.
Id. at 8-9.
46. Id. at8.
47. See Theodore Marmor, How We Got to Where We Are: American Health Care
Politics, 1970 to 1990, in UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE REFORM 21,28-30 (Theodore Marmor

ed., 1994) (criticizing public financing economists for not consulting public opinion findings or
qualitative work on social beliefs from anthropology or social psychology).
48. See JAcoBs, supra note 18, at 191-93 (noting wide-spread support for Medicare
despite little public understanding of the program); Lawrence R.Jacobs et al., The Polls-Poll
Trends: Medical Care in the United States-An Update, 57 PUB. OPINION Q. 394, 394-95
(1993) (giving the results of public opinion polls regarding health care issues in the 1992
presidential campaign); see generally KARLYN BOWMAN, PUBLIC OPINION AND MEDICARE
RESTRUCTURING:

THREE VIEWS, IN MEDICARE: PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21 ST

281 (Robert D. Reischauer et al. eds., 1998) (examining the significance of public
support and public opposition to Medicare reforms).
49. See JACOBS, supra note 18, at 191-93 (noting Medicare's broad popularity).
50. See PUBLIC AGENDA, MEDICARE: RED FLAGS, at http://www.publicagenda.org (March
1997) (displaying the results of a 1997 Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard
University poll that found a full 53% of respondents willing to admit they knew "very little"
about Medicare) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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expansion has not been achieved."' The original hope was that Medicare would
grow into universal health insurance, not coverage only for the elderly, the
disabled, and those suffering from renal failure.12 Moreover, the reformers
anticipated that Medicare would largely remove financial fearfulness from the3
lives of older Americans facing sickness, injury, and other medical burdens.1
That, as Marilyn Moon and others have aptly demonstrated, has not been
accomplished for a variety of reasons.5 4 Because the claims are factually false,
so are the causal connections.
Moreover, if Aaron and Reischauer's factual claims about politically
relevant factors are questionable, the "implications" drawn are equally suspect.
None of them are "straightforward"" in the sense that reasonable analysts could
not find grounds for questioning their normative plausibility or predictive
accuracy. Consider one claim where the grounds for objection are quite
obvious: the assertion that "congressional reforms will-and should-bring
Medicare more in line with the structure of health care5financing
and delivery
6
that is evolving to serve the non-Medicare population.
Underlying this claim is the view, later made explicit, that Medicare
should be adapted to what itself is "evolving" as a practical matter of avoiding
resentment." This claim assumes, but does not substantiate, the belief that
Medicare's operation should resemble the health insurance practices other
Americans confront, irrespective of any demonstrated superiority of the
"evolving"practices andpublic supportfor them. That assumption ought to
invite skepticism on normative grounds, but the more important point for
present purposes is an empirical one. Simply put, there is no credible evidence
for the prediction that voucher enthusiasm will arise from resentment about the
elderly having a broader set of choices than younger Americans. By our
reading, what evidence there is actually suggests just the opposite.
51. See Marmor & McKissick, supra note 37, at 227-30 (relating the expectation of
incremental program expansion to Medicare's origins).
52. See MARMOR, supra note 17, at 6-10 (providing a narrative history and more
extensive analysis of Medicare's origins and operations).
53. See id. at 12 (examining the factors that limited senior citizens' access to health
insurance before Medicare).
54.

See MARILYN MOON & JANEMARIE MULVEY, ENTITLEMENTS AND THE ELDERLY:

PROTECTING PROMISES, RECOGNIZING REALITY 35, 89-93 (1996) (discussing the limited

expansion of Medicare).
55. See Aaron & Reischauer, supra note 40, at 8 ("The implications of these facts are
straightforward.").
56. Id.
57. Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, "Rethinking Medicare Reform" Needs
Rethinking, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 69, 69.
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To understand the public's likely response to such ideas, one must
recognize that Medicare vouchers presume a large shift to managed care
organizations.5 8 The interpretation of resentment by voucher enthusiasts thus

requires a groundswell of support for moving the elderly into managed care.
But therein lies an immediate puzzle. How can that be reconciled with the
evidence about the public's critical views of the managed care industry? A

managed care backlash has by now become a well-established finding in
research on the public's views on healthcare.5 9 The evidence of a backlash
against managed care reflects considerable frustration with constraints on
patient choice. 60 But, it is not at all obvious that such frustration has led to any
resentment of Medicare's benefits. Indeed, the opposite seems more plausible.
If the reactions embodied by the efforts to legislate a "patient's bill of rights"
are any indication, the general public's dissatisfaction with "choice" will more
efforts to make private health care more like
likely produce more vigorous
6
"traditional" Medicare. 1
58. See Marmor & Oberlander, supra note 38, at 59 (noting rosy predictions of rapid
managed care growth).
59. See generally The Managed Care Backlash, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 860 (1999)
(devoting its entire October 1999 issue to the reasons for and implications of the managed care
backlash); see also Robert J. Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash,
HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 1998, at 80, 80-85 (reporting a 1998 Harris poll that illustrates the illregard with which the public views the managed care industry). In that poll, managed care firms
ranked second from the bottom in terms of the public's positive feelings about them; only
tobacco companies ranked lower. Id. See also Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert S. Shapiro, The
American Public'sPragmaticLiberalism Meets its PhilosophicalConservatism, 24 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 1021, 1024-25 (1999) (discussing poll results on America's reaction to
managed care); Press Release, Kaiser Family Foundation, National Survey Suggests Need for
Broad Public Debate About Medicare Reform, at http://www.kff.org/ medicare/I 442-index.cfm
(October 20, 1998) (presenting public opinion on managed care providers) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. See generally Gail R. Wilensky, What's Behind the Public'sBacklash? 24 J. HEALTH,
HEALTH POL'Y & L. 873 (1999) (providing further analysis on the backlash against managed
care); Jacobs & Shapiro, supra note 59, at 1021 (1999) (same); Robert J. Blendon et al., supra
note 59, at 80 (same).
61. When one considers the character of some of the other policy changes that the
managed care backlash has helped produce, such as restrictions on insurers' ability to limit
hospital stays after routine births, the odds increase that this alternative reaction will occur. See
Eli Ginzberg & Miriam Ostrow, Managed Care-A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 336 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1018, 1020 (1997) (highlighting the public's dissatisfaction with managed care).
Combine a general antipathy toward managed care firms with sympathetic target groups (new
mothers, vulnerable patients) and the impulse toward restricting the practices of insurers fits
with our general understanding of the ways in which lawmakers respond to public opinion. See
generally R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990) (discussing ways
in which politicians anticipate and respond to the preferences of constituents and worry about
the incidence of costs and benefits distributed across groups of voters). Despite the efforts of
generational equity enthusiasts to paint the elderly as "greedy geezers," senior citizens remain,
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What explains such ill-supported claims of resentment? Two accounts

come to mind. The first (and, we hope, least likely) possibility is that voucher
proponents, as trained economists, see little value in the systematic study of
public opinion. In this view, appealing to public opinion is often little more
than storytelling, a sort of fanciful speculation about what sorts of attitudes
might exist that would justify a particular overhaul of Medicare. Casual
speculation is not, however, a basis for credible policy analysis. The second,
more generous interpretation, is that these claims rest on a distinctive reading of
the available data. It is true, for instance, that younger cohorts typically express
less support for Medicare and greater skepticism about the program's future
than do older cohorts. 62 To note these differences is one thing. To interpret
them as evidence of generational resentment is quite another.6 3 In this case, the
as a group, closer to the new mothers/vulnerable patients end of the scale than to the greedy
insurers end. Jacobs & Shapiro, supra note 59, at 1024-25 (finding a lack of public confidence
in managed care plans, HMOs, and health insurance companies); Kaiser Family Foundation,
supra note 59 (reporting the generational differences in views on Medicare, showing support for
Medicare in cohorts over and under the age of 65).
62. Note that Medicare is still quite popular among even the youngest cohorts. See Kaiser
Family Foundation, supra note 59 (showing strong support for the preservation of Medicare).
To say that younger voters are less supportive of Medicare is not to say that they are
unsupportive of it. See id. at 10 (displaying public opinion data). Solid majorities remain for the
program, even among young adults. As for the measures of skepticism about the program's
future, it is harder to say what such expressions of doubt mean. After all, one may like a
program and still have doubts about its future. See id. (showing that a majority of those polled
believed that Medicare was headed towards acrisis). In that sense, expressions of skepticism do
not provide meaningful direction for policymaking in the way that expressions of support and
opposition do. As Karlyn Bowman has argued, concern about a program's future and talk of
crisis may be "simply a way for people to say to their elected legislators: 'Pay attention. This
issue is important to me.'' Karlyn Bowman, Public Opinion and Medicare Restructuring:
Three Views, in MEDICARE: PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21STCENTURY283 (Robert
D. Reischauer et al. eds., 1998). With these caveats in mind, we simply note that young adults
show up as more skeptical than older adults. But skepticism among the latter age group is easy
to find in the survey data as well. What the skepticism means remains open to debate, adebate
that in our view is unlikely to be resolved without richer data. Robert J.Blendon has written a
recent study that reports greater skepticism among other younger cohorts. See generally Robert
J. Blendon, Public Opinion and Medicare Restructuring: Three Views, in MEDICARE:
PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21 ST CENTURY 288 (Robert D. Reischauer et. al. eds.,
1998). He found, for instance, that the under thirty cohort was the only one in which amajority
of individuals predicted bankruptcy for Medicare. See id. at 290 (discussing public opinion
data).
63. It is also the case that neither the size nor the direction of the differences has operated
in the past as the resentment advocates would claim. According to one scholar of public
opinion and the elderly, based on survey data from the National Election Study through 1988,
"the nonelderly were consistently more likely to say the federal government spends too little on
Social Security and health care, Medicare, or care for the elderly." Laurie A. Rhodebeck, The
Politics of Greed? Political Preferences Among the Elderly, 55 J.POL. 342,350 (1993). Given
the increased conservatism of younger cohorts in recent years, we do not want to make too much
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inferential leaps do not withstand serious scrutiny. In the first place, they
require- stability in cohort-specific preferences over time that is unlikely.
Second, they disregard the likelihood that the preferences of younger cohorts
may largely reflect their relative ignorance of Medicare's operation.
If the problems with Aaron and Reischauer's treatment of public opinion
were idiosyncratic, there would be no point belaboring them. Unhappily, the
weakness of their approach is representative of many Medicare analysts. The
failure to attend seriously to public opinion research on Medicare reflects a
troubling tendency in much health services scholarship. In this sense, Aaron
and Reischauer exemplify a broader problem. Economists, in particular, all too
frequently practice a strain of policy analysis that treats the "political" part of
political economy as barely more than an afterthought. 4 To be sure, one might
expect a tilt toward a scholar's home discipline.65 In our view, however, the
emphasis on economic analysis at the expense of politics needs rebalancing.
That rebalancing requires eliminating casual appeals to mass attitudes,
and, instead, substituting attention to the existing research on public opinion.
This research makes clear that the mapping of attitudes expressed in public
opinion surveys onto specific policy proposals is rarely straightforward.66
Substantial uncertainty and unclear preferences can be masked in responses to
questions about policies as removed from public understanding as is
Medicare.67 Moreover, as Jon Oberlander has argued, public opinion has, at

of the patterns found by Rhodebeck. See Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Ideological
Realignment in the U.S. Electorate,60 J. POL. 634, 639-42 (1998) (noting a trend toward the
Republican party among younger cohorts). It is enough for our purposes simply to note that, in
the not too distant past, younger cohorts seemed perfectly willing to support programs for the
elderly.
64. See MARMOR, supra note 17, at 185-91 (discussing the tendency of economists to
avoid political concerns); see also Anthony Beilenson, Leadership and Politics: Four Views, in
s
MEDICARE: PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21 CENTURY 280, 285 (Robert D.

Reischauer et al. eds., 1998) (same). But see Uwe E. Reinhardt, A Primer for Journalists on
Medicare Reform Proposals (April 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
(providing an exception to economists' tendency to avoid political concerns and, instead,
offering a good illustration of combining economic, political, and policy analysis).
65. Given the benefits of specialization it is hardly surprising-and it may even do some
good-that economists tend to approach these questions by putting economics front and center.
For a more extended discussion, see MARMOR, supra note 17, at 185-91.
66. See Marmor, supra note 47, at 28-30 (discussing the role of public opinion in
Medicare policymaking).
67. See Jacobs & Shapiro, supra note 59, at 1022-26 (discussing public perceptions of
managed care); see generally JACOBS & SHAPIRO, supra note 25 (arguing that politicians often
produce-rather than respond to-public opinion, strategically manipulating polls and question
wording to, in effect, create mass "preferences" consistent with their policy objectives).
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moments, stopped Medicare reform, but it has never driven it.68 It typically has

a more negative impact on policymaking, serving to constrain policy options
rather than create them.69 To the extent it has been influential, it has set limits
on efforts to transform Medicare, particularly serving to constrain program

cutbacks.70 In so far as voucher proposals can be seen as an attempt to cut back
public benefits indirectly, there is no demand for them from the public.7 As
congressional Republicans learned during the 104th Congress, Medicare
cutbacks are extremely difficult to achieve in the absence of clear public
mandates for change.72
Public opinion, properly understood, may doom voucher reforms. But it
did not produce them, and it provides little support for making Medicare into a
system of vouchers. There may well be a defensible rationale for vouchers, but
it cannot be found in the evidence available from research on American public
opinion.73
B. The Perils of Prediction
Another issue raised by politically presumptive writing concerns
predictions about the political agenda over time. The commentary on
Medicare, as with other programs, is regularly accompanied by claims about
68. See Oberlander, supra note I, at 250-54 (discussing the role of public opinion in
Medicare policymaking).
69. See id. (discussing Medicare's lack of growth despite mass support for expanded
benefits).
70. See id. (noting the absence of cutbacks on Medicare benefits).
71. One experienced public opinion analyst characterizes the available evidence on the
public's support for vouchers this way:
A voucher system described in various ways in various polls seems to attract the
support of about 30 percent of the population. It is not clear from the data I have
seen exactly how firm that support is. Do these respondents reject the system we
have now? Is the response simply a message to do something to save the system?
Or is the 30 percent a measure of actual support for a voucher system or some
alternative? I am not sure that we know the answers judging from the current
questions in the public domain.
BOWMAN, supra note 48, at 285.
72. See Peterson, supra note 24, at 201-19 (discussing Republican strategies to enact
health care reform).
73. See generally Marmor & Oberlander, supranote 38 (providing a deeper discussion of
the many reasons not to support voucher plans). But see generally Aaron & Reischauer, supra
note 57 (responding to Marmor and Oberlander's arguments and a defense of vouchers); Stuart
M. Butler, Medicare Price Controls: The Wrong Prescription,HEALTH AFr., Jan./Feb. 1998, at

72, 73 (same).
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what the future will be like years and decades into the future. Our contention is
that configurations of partisan balance and economic circumstances cannot be
easily anticipated, and that all-to-common overconfidence in speculation on
these subjects is, at the very least, unwarranted. Aaron and Reischauer provide
a reminder of the importance of prudent political analysis with the boldness of
their claims about the future. Take, for instance, the assertion that "the cost of
providing Medicare benefits is projected to rise very rapidly and will exceed
projected revenues by ever larger amounts. 7 4 It was obvious in 1995 that
Medicare's projected costs were rising and that the revenues would likely rise
less rapidly than the forecasted costs. But, that merely illustrates a truism:
Forecasts are not so much serious predictions as conditional claims whose truth
depends entirely on the accuracy of the premises.7" By 2000, the view that
Medicare's costs would continue to rise at ten percent per year into the
indefinite future76 seemed odd indeed.
Likewise, the prediction that comprehensive health care reform would
remain off the "political agenda ...for years to come,"7 7 illustrates easy
extrapolation rather than serious forecasting. In 1995, Washington insiders,
reeling from the Clinton reform debacle, were predisposed to think that health
care reform was over for as far as the eye could see. 78 They turned out to be
wrong, as health care issues returned to the agenda in limited form. 79 Indeed,
by 2000, health reform issues arose again in connection with that year's
election. Both candidates seeking the Democratic presidential nomination
unveiled serious proposals for health care reforn--this on top of months of
congressional attention to reforms of the health insurance industry embodied in
the so-called "Patients' Bill of Rights."80 According to a November 1999 poll
by the New York Times and CBS News, health care topped the list of issues the
public most wanted Congress and the president to address.81
Aaron & Reischauer, supra note 40, at 8.
THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE:
PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 216-18 (1990) (discussing the inherent fallibility of
long-term cost prediction).
76. See Aaron & Reischauer, supra note 40, at 10 (predicting long-term cost growth).
77. Id. at 8.
78. See Robin Toner, Health Care Autopsy: Plenty of Targets to Blamefor Failure,
PHOENIX GAZETrE, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al (discussing the collapse of the healthcare reform
agenda).
79. See Robin Toner, The Hard Lessons of Health Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1999,
74.

75.

See

Section 4, at 1 (discussing President Clinton's 1999 Medicare reform proposal).
80. Patients' Bill of Rights, S.1256, 105th Cong. (1999).
81.

See Sean Wilentz, For Voters, the 60's Never Died, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at

A27 (noting continued public support for health care reform and other traditionally liberal
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The reappearance of health care reforms on the national agenda is a
reminder that political forecasting is always an exercise fraught with
uncertainty. Scholars of agenda-setting have established that the ebbs and
flows of political agendas are a complex product of many forces. Each of these
forces is subject to considerable uncertainty at any given time, and their
combination is even more difficult to predict.8 2 Periods of continuity can
coexist with sudden and large changes in policy agendas.83 While agenda
scholars understand the families of factors that affect both the incremental and
dramatic dynamics of policy debates, they are incapable of anticipating the
precise timing and consequences of these factors as they interact. As a result,
one should 4view point predictions of future political agendas with great
skepticism.1

The futurology of Aaron and Reischauer, as with their use of public
opinion, is important because it conforms to wider practices that have long
plagued Medicare policy analysis. Medicare's harshest critics have regularly
engaged in a form of "future dread," where they dress up projections of
Medicare's financial status decades into the future with an unjustifiable
certainty." Such long-range projections are notoriously sensitive to even slight
changes in their underlying components. Witness, for example, the difference
between HCFA's 1995 projection that kick-started the current debate over
massive changes and its report just four years later that projected an additional
thirteen years of "solvency."8 6 For good reason, sensible analysts approach
long range forecasts with caution. But, the same logic that recommends caution
in projecting a program's financial future also requires restraint in using those
very same projections to make the case for major changes from current policy.
issues).
82. See generally JOHN W. KiNGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES
(1984) (discussing how political agendas depend on a confluence ofproblem recognition, policy
solutions, and political conditions); FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND
INSTABILITY INAMERICAN POLITICS (1993) (proposing a punctuated equilibrium model ofpolicy
change, tracing the history of policy change in 20th century America, and analyzing the longterm changes in the structures and context of American political institutions).
83. See BAUMGARTNER & JONES, supra note 82, at 57 (proposing a punctuated

equilibrium model of policy change and agenda setting).
84. See generally Theodore R. Marmor, Forecasting American Health Care: How We
Got Here and Where We Might be Going, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 551 (1998) (providing

a more extensive discussion of the dangers of forecasting).
85. See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 75, at 137 (1990) (refuting pessimistic projections of
Social Security's future).
86. See Henry J. Aaron, Budget Estimates: What We Know, What We Can't Know, and
Why It Matters, in POLICIES FOR AN AGING SOCIETY 71 (Stuart H. Altman & David I. Shactman

eds., 2002). See Table 3.1 on projections of Medicare outlays.
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To do otherwise, as when proponents of restructuring Medicare forecast a
future of certain crisis, is to misuse such long-range projections. The need for
an honest recognition of the limits of forecasting increases in the case of
Medicare, where the environment is marked by frequent technological change
and is embedded in a larger and changing world of private and public health
care.17 Of course, this point is not lost on analysts as experienced as Aaron and
Reischauer. Indeed, Aaron himself recently issued similar cautions, going so
far as to assert that "a fog of fundamental ' unknowability
shrouds projections of
8
Medicare costs beyond just a few years.
The uncertainty about Medicare's future costs is but one limitation on
confident forecasting. It is compounded by the dependence on such forecasts in
the service of promoting current proposals for reform. Too often, the desire to
rationalize policy prescriptions masks inherent risks of long-range forecasts-a
danger that even the most thoughtful analysts face. When such impulses are
combined with a failure to recognize the even greater difficulty in forecasting
politics (as opposed to demographics or economics), the dangers of what we
have described as unfounded futurology are maximized. The result is all too
often fear-mongering masquerading as forecasting, a practice that distorts one's
understanding of Medicare's current problems and future possibilities.89
C. Confusions of Conventional Wisdom
Another source of confusion in the Medicare debate arises from claims
reported as current conventional wisdom about the program's future. One such
mistaken view asserts that, because Medicare faces financial strain, the program
requires dramatic transformation. 90 The experience of the 1980s and much of
the 1990s showed that Medicare's administrators, when willing and able, could
limit the pace of increase in the program's costs. 91 Consider, also, that
Medicare controlled its spending growth more tightly than did private health
insurance during most of the last two decades 9 2-this even though private
87. For similar points about the consequences of Medicare's complex environment, see
Jermoe P. Kassirer, Managing ManagedCare'sTarnishedImage, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 33839 (1997); Aaron, supra note 86, at 16.
88. Aaron, supra note 86, at 70-71, 77.
89. See id. at 63-64, 68-70 (discussing the misuse of long-range projections).
90. See MARMOR, supra note 17, at 189-91 (describing "politically presumptive writing").
91. See MOON, supra note 7, at 19 (noting Medicare's superior ability to control costs
through the early 1990s).
92. See MARILYN MOON, BENEATH THE AVERAGES: AN ANALYSIS OF MEDICARE AND
PRIVATE EXPENDITURES 13 (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundations, Report No. 1505, 2000)
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insurance was undergoing massive changes aimed at controlling costs
during this period. 93 To be sure, controlling the program's future costs
poses undeniable challenges to policymakers just as it has before.
Mustering the political will to implement cost-control measures is no small
the
feat. But, it is worth remembering that policymakers have managed
94
task in the past without having to reshape Medicare radically.
The very language used to define the financial problems Medicare
undoubtedly faces is another source of distortion. Republican, as well as a
number of Democratic critics continue to use the fearful language of
insolvency to describe Medicare's future. 95 That future, according to this
one in which the program's trust fund will be literally
group, is a dreaded
"out of money. 9 6 This language represents the unfortunate triumph of
metaphor over thought. 97 Thinking that Medicare's trust fund is its crucial
fiscal variable is analogous to thinking that a thermometer's reading
constitutes a heat wave or a freeze.98 "The program's hospital 'trust fund'

(comparing expenditure growth rates in Medicare and private health insurance).
93. MOON, supra note 7, at 19.
94. Doubts about policymakers mustering the political will required to impose fiscal
discipline on the program through marginal adjustments stand curiously at odds with radical
reformers' strong faith in these same policymakers' willingness to summon the political courage
to make fundamental changes to the program's design.
95. Remarks on Returning without Approval to the House of Representatives the
Taxpayer Refund and ReliefAct of 1999,35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1793 (Sept. 23,1999).
96. President Touts Successes in Remarks to LR Chamber, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Dec. 12, 1999, at A21.
97. See generally MARMOR, supra note 17 (describing further the ironies of the political
evolution of Medicare's trust fund). The same social-insurance financing of hospital services
that was so critical to gaining political support for Medicare in the first place has, through its
artifact, the trust fund, ironically become one of its greatest political vulnerabilities and the
nominal foundation to support the attacks ofthe program's harshest critics; see also Oberlander,
supra note I, at 129-50 (arguing that Congress adopted the Medicare trust fund to assure
political stability, but it has actually turned out to be a source of instability). But see generally
Eric Patashnik & Julian Zelizer, Paying for Medicare: Benefits, Budgets, and Wilbur Mills's
Policy Legacy (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (disputing the view that this
development is an ironic legacy of the trust fund device). Patashnik and Zelizer argue instead
that fiscal conservatives understood the implications of the trust fund mechanism from inception
and its ability to impose discipline on Medicare's budget was crucial to their willingness to
support the program. Id.
98. Another analogy is useful here. When the United States declares war, no one shouts
that the Department of Defense will run out of money. There is, of course, debate over the
wisdom of the military engagement and disputes over the willingness of Congress to pay for the
additional war-related expenses. However, no one would contend that the increased expenses
due to anew military engagement will "cause" the-Department of Defense to become bankrupt.
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refers to an accounting' 9term, a conventional way to describe earmarked
revenue and spending.
The very notion of a public trust fund combines the language of trust
with the funding-source reality of payroll taxes to underscore the solidity of
commitment to finance promised benefits in social insurance programs.' 00
The appeal to "insolvency" as a danger needs to be recognized for its
symbolic and strategic value in framing the debate over Medicare. Such
symbolic framing can be politically consequential.' 0 ' For that very reason,
though, policy analysts should guard against misleading symbols.
Whatever its psychological and political importance, the trust associated
with the fund is a fiscally neutral element in the goods and services
Medicare finances. Congress can change the taxes that finance Medicare if
it has the will. Likewise, it can change the benefits and reimbursement
provisions of the program. Or it can do some of both, as it has at different
times in Medicare's operational history. Channeling the program's
revenues through something called a "trust fund" changes nothing in the
real political economy. Thinking so is the cause of much muddle,

unwarranted fearfulness, and misdirected energy.'0 2
99.
100.

MARMOR, Supra note 17, at 135.
See generally ERIC M. PATASHNIK, PLrrING TRUST IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET: FEDERAL

TRUST FUNDS AND THE POLITICS OF COMMITMENT (2000) (describing federal trust funds).
101. See generally MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964) (exploring
the symbolic processes underlying political claims); CHARLES ELDER & ROGER COBB, THE
POLITICAL USES OF SYMBOLS (1983) (examining the importance of symbols as a basis for
political activity); Gary J. McKissick, Defining Choices: Interest Group Lobbying and the
Framing of Policy Alternatives (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
102. The oddity of worrying about a Medicare bankruptcy is also apparent when one
considers the different political responses to the funding shortfalls for Medicare's
hospitalization coverage (Part A), on the one hand, and the shortfalls for its coverage for
physician services (Part B), on the other. Hospitalization insurance alone is financed by payroll
taxes earmarked for Medicare's Part A trust fund. This is a mechanism designed explicitly to
echo the same social-insurance principles as Social Security pensions. In contrast, when
Congress tacked on physician services as Part B of the 1965 Medicare bill, premium payments
from current beneficiaries and from general federal tax revenues were to finance physician
expenses. Because general tax revenues can only run short, but not out, projected shortfalls in
paying for physician services have simply been covered by additional general revenues, by
increased premiums, or by cutbacks in expenditures. As a consequence, there have never been
Medicare-Part-B crises of the form associated with Part A. It is only the projected shortfalls in
the hospital trust fund that have triggered the recurrent crises over Medicare and the use of
bankruptcy language. Thus, the experience with the trust fund demonstrates how important the
funding mechanisms can be for the politics of a program. In that sense, the use of a trust fund is
more than an accounting term of art. It has very real political implications and consequences.
For a cogent discussion of the different "crisis" politics of Medicare's component parts see
Oberlander, supra note 1. For an insightful analysis of the politics of government trust funds
see PATASHNIK, supra note 100.
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D. Explicit PoliticalAnalysis Without Sufficient Evidence
A final category of regrettable misunderstanding of Medicare is analysis
that is explicitly political in its aims, but that proceeds without sufficient
appreciation of Medicare's actual experiences.
Here political and
programmatic analysis rests on deductive reasoning, economic assumptions,
and theories about the behavior of government and political actors that
substitute for empirical analysis of Medicare.
This type of analysis follows a predictable script with government
programs portrayed as inefficient, financially uncontrollable, constraining of
individual choice, and ineffective. The market is alternatively cast as efficient,
effective at controlling the costs of medical care, and promoting choice. The
irony of this tale is that its widespread prevalence in health economics contrasts
with its amazing lack of veracity as a framework for accurately understanding
health policy or describing modem health systems. 0 3 To name but one of
many problems with this perspective, the presumption that market competition
controls medical care spending coexists with the reality that the U.S. has more
market competition in its health system than any other industrial democracy,
and yet, far and away spends the most on medical care. This seeming conflict
does not prompt rethinking the role of markets in medical care, because the
political economy conclusion stems not from empirical analysis but from
unsupported presumption. Health economist Roger Feldman thus scolds his
fellow economists for not doing enough to prove the obvious by offering "a
cogent analysis of why government control of health care does not work."' 4
This conflation of normative values with political analysis is abundantly
evident in the literature of positive political economy on Medicare. So, for
example, Ronald Vogel, a public choice analyst, presumes it is entirely
predictable that "Medicare began with structural flaws and continues to contain
structural flaws .... ",105 What is left unsaid is that that from this perspective all
government social programs are, a priori, presumed to be inherently flawed
because they disrupt the virtues of the competitive market. Accordingly, Vogel
dismisses the ability of federal payment policies such as DRGs to control
Medicare spending. Incredibly, he does so by citing a single study that is not
primarily concerned with Medicare and without reference to the work of
103. See generally RICE, supra note 15 (providing an excellent critique of these
assumptions in health care economics).
104. ROGER D. FELDMAN, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: GOVERNMENT, MARKET PROCESSES
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 2-3 (2000).
105. RONALD J. VOGEL, MEDICARE: ISSUES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 3 (1999). Political
choice perspective refers to an application of microeconomic theory to politics.
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Marilyn Moon and others documenting Medicare's success in cost control
relative to private insurance. 10 6 This illustration is an unfortunately egregious
one of normative commitments masquerading as analysis, thereby producing
conclusions based on presumption rather than careful engagement with the
evidence.
Mark Pauly offers another illustration of explicit political analysis without
understanding. Pauly sets out to explain, from a political economic perspective,
"why the United States provides mixed public (Medicare) and private
(Medigap) insurance for the elderly."'0 7 Finding that "there is no definitive
efficiency rationale" for this phenomenon, Pauly alternatively notes that:
there is a positive political economy explanation that suggests that...
majority rule voting could lead to the choice of a mixed government and
market system. The disturbing implication of this important finding is that
outcomes from politically chosen mixes schemes are not necessarily
efficiency improving ....
The only rationale for the public program is that
it might have avoided
more
adverse selection problems in the private
08
insurance market.1
What is striking about Pauly's explanation for the development of
Medigap policies alongside public Medicare is that it is not based on any
examination of Medicare's political history. There is no attempt to describe the
origins of Medicare or how its benefit structure developed over time. Nor does
Pauly cite any of the Medicare politics literature, instead choosing to focus on
theories of majority rule voting. In Pauly's view, there is no need to attend to
the actual reasons why supplemental insurance developed, because once again,
deductive reasoning is presumed to be an adequate basis for political analysis.
Outcomes are simply taken to be reasonable grounds to assume intent and
purpose, precluding the necessity to study legislative origins and policy history.
V. Conclusion
Medicare, a major program of American public life, continues to be
systematically misunderstood. The serious literature on Medicare's politics is
not available to most of the public, is not recognized in the writing of those
who generate the bulk of policy proposals, and is underrepresented in health
services research. Furthermore, much of that research is premised on the
106.

Id. at 17.
Mark V. Pauly, The Medicare Mix: Efficient and Inefficient Combinations ofSocial
and Private Health Insurance For U.S. Elderly, 26 J. HEALTH CARE FiN. 26, 26-37 (2000).
108. Id. at 29.
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assumption of unanimous agreement about what Medicare should do, leaving to
be resolved only the question of what will work.
Our commentary has been sharply critical of the omission of systematic
attention to Medicare politics in policy analysis. 0 9 Too much of this literature
maintains an indefensible separation between policymaking and politics. Yet,
simply engaging in political analysis is not the same as conducting sound
political analysis. We are also sharply critical of a particular type of thinking
about Medicare's politics, that of regrettable misunderstanding discussed in the
preceding section. This sort of casual political analysis undermines the
authority of careful policy analysis. The remedy for it is a mix of self-restraint
and more serious attention to what political science can (and cannot) tell us
It hurts rather than helps public
about Medicare's likely future." 0
understanding of what should and can be done in American policymaking to
substantiate program evaluation with politically superficial judgments. This is
particularly important where the political analysis is presented as scholarship,
but not bolstered by evidentiary support or defensible inferences. We do not
argue that scholars should hide their normative preferences. They should state
them clearly. Nor do we suggest that political scientists have a monopoly on
commentary about American political realities (or Medicare's). Rather, our
claim is that scholarly standards should apply to claims about politics by those
invoking analytical authority for their policy conclusions.
This is especially so given the stakes involved in reforming Medicare as
the baby-boom generation approaches retirement. If the future of Medicare
depends on clarifying policy choices and values, we can ill afford to have a
commentary on Medicare that is dominated by misunderstanding and
mythology.

109. This paragraph draws on Marmor & McKissick, supra note 37, at 248.
110. What should one expect from those who are experts on the details of Medicare's
programmatic operation who commit the conceptually distinct sin of leaving out political
analysis altogether? For this sin of omission, the answer is this: a clear acknowledgement of
the limitations of such assessments for either predicting Medicare's future or prescribing

reforms at any particular time. Such work makes a valuable contribution inproviding careful
attention to the programmatic details of Medicare's history. Nevertheless, the caution about
limits remains.

